1) The ITIC reports on last weekend’s Violence Along the Gaza Strip Border which has to date been ignored by the BBC.
“On Saturday, August 21, 2021, Hamas and the other Palestinian terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip carried out their threat to increase tension along the border with Israel and hold riots near the border security fence. It was in spite of the announcement an arrangement had been found to deliver the money from Qatar to needy families in the Gaza Strip, and despite Israel’s announcement of additional measures to ease conditions for Gazan civilians. This time excuse used for a riot was the anniversary of the 1969 attempt to set fire to al-Aqsa mosque. During the unusually extensive, severe riot, hundreds of Palestinians clashed with Israeli security forces, approaching and trying to climb the border security fence and wall near the Karni Crossing in the northern Gaza Strip. They threw rocks and IEDs at IDF forces and burned tires. IDF fighters, who had been deployed at the site, employed riot control measures and according to necessity, sniper fire. During the riot a Border Police fighter was critically wounded by a Palestinian terrorist operative who shot him at close range through an aperture in the wall.”
2) At the INSS Yohanan Tzoreff analyses the current situation in Palestinian Authority controlled areas.
“Three months after Operation Guardian of the Walls, it appears that the status of Abu Mazen and the status of the Palestinian Authority (PA) continue to deteriorate. Public rage is ongoing, expressions of distrust in the PA agencies resound, allegations of PA corruption accompanied by sarcasm have intensified, and violent clashes between clans have multiplied, while the PA security forces are afraid to intervene. This is not just more criticism aimed at bringing about a change in policy or the removal from the agenda of some measure planned by the PA. It shows disgust and a lack of interest in continuation of the PA in its current format. The PA is perceived as corrupt, unfit, and bound to collapse and be reconstituted along different foundations.”
3) At WINEP, Hanin Ghaddar proposes ‘A Strategy to Contain Hezbollah’.
“Even if outside actors manage to impose their will on Lebanon and compel some reforms and elections, the fundamentals in the country are unlikely to change, because Hezbollah has a plan for that, too. As the most powerful organization in the country—far better armed than the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)— Hezbollah is ready to protect by military might what it has preserved through a corrupt political system. This is precisely what Hezbollah did when it lost the 2005 and 2009 parliamentary elections, using its arms against fellow Lebanese and forcing the majority so-called March 14 coalition—formed in 2005 after Lebanon’s Cedar Revolution—to assemble unprecedented national unity governments. By brandishing its weapons, it defined a new “win or lose” political reality: when Hezbollah wins, it governs; when it loses, it still governs.”
4) Nadav Shragai discusses Saudi-Hamas relations at Israel Hayom.
“Not too many years ago, the idea of a Saudi court sending dozens of Hamas members who had been operating out of the kingdom to prison would have seemed almost inconceivable. But this week, what once appeared a near-impossibility came to pass. Saudi Arabia, which used to be an economic paradise for members of al-Qaida and Hamas, sentenced 64 Hamas operatives convicted of money laundering and smuggling money to Hamas’ armed wing in the Gaza Strip to prison.”