1) The ITIC documents reactions to the elimination of Yahya Sinwar.
“The elimination of Yahya al-Sinwar was condemned in the Palestinian arena, including by the Palestinian Authority (PA), which has repeatedly criticized Hamas and al-Sinwar for the attack on October 7, 2023. Al-Sinwar was praised for his role in the “resistance” against Israel and his death “in battle:” […]
Fatah described his end as “honorable” for every Palestinian. The movement praised him for choosing “to leave the world in a manner befitting his heroism and the heroism of the Palestinian people, bearing the task of defending the righteousness of the Palestinian cause”.”
2) MEMRI reports on reactions in Qatar to Sinwar’s elimination.
“Israel’s October 17, 2024 elimination of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, architect of the Hamas-led October 7, 2023 invasion and massacres in southern Israel, sparked much praise of Sinwar from influential figures in Qatar, including from Qatar Foundation chairperson Sheikha Moza Bint Nasser, who is the mother of current Qatari Emir Tamim Bin Hamad Aal Thani and the wife of former Emir Hamad Bin Khalifa Aal Thani, as well as from Al-Jazeera reporters, other Qatari journalists, and members of the Qatar-backed International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS).”
3) The Alma Center documents ‘Hezbollah Attacks Against Israel Since the Beginning of the Ground Maneuver in Lebanon’.
“Since the beginning of the IDF’s ground maneuvers in southern Lebanon until today (October 1–20, 2024), Hezbollah has carried out 730 attacks against Israel, averaging 36.5 attacks per day. In comparison, in the months preceding the maneuver, the average monthly attack was 270 (9 attacks per day). The daily average of strikes today is four times the pre-maneuver average. Since the beginning of the maneuver, Hezbollah has claimed responsibility for another 50 attacks for which there was no verification.”
4) At the JCFA, Jacques Neriah looks at ‘How the Elimination of Hizbullah’s Hassan Nasrallah Is Affecting Lebanese Politics’.
“A few days after the elimination of Hizbullah’s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, the Lebanese body politic behaved as if the time had come to call for a national mobilization to elect a president for Lebanon, a position vacant since October 2022. Such an election would trigger a chain reaction with the nomination of a legal government, a legal prime minister, and top positions in the state. Most importantly, such a president would be allowed by the constitution to negotiate a political settlement ending the war with Israel and marginalizing Hizbullah’s role in Lebanese politics. […]
Feeling the change of the wind, and with an effort to prevent the collapse of Hizbullah, Iran intervened by dispatching to Beirut its foreign minister Araqchi, who conducted stormy conversations with both Mikati and Nabih Berri, conversations that Walid Jumblatt qualified as humiliating. As a result, the Shiite component of Lebanese politics, namely what it called the “Shiite twins,” conceded to the idea that there would be no presidential elections until the end of the war.”
5) At WINEP, Matthew Levitt and Sarah Boches analyse ‘Iranian External Operations in Europe: The Criminal Connection’.
“Iranian external operations are a tactic Tehran employs to address several different perceived threats to the revolutionary regime. Iran targets current and former U.S. officials to avenge the January 2020 targeted killing of Quds Force General Qassem Soleimani. It targets Israeli officials and businesspeople as part of its shadow war with Israel and commitment to Israel’s destruction. It targets Jews—from prominent Jewish businesspersons in Europe to Jewish college students in the U.S.—and it targets Iranian dissidents and journalists abroad who expose the regime’s brutality to the world and empower Iranians to challenge the revolutionary regime.”
6) At the FDD, Seth Frantzman discusses the rise in UAV attacks against Israel.
“The drone threat is increasing. Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and other Iranian-backed groups, such as Shiite militias in Iraq, have been using UAVs over the past year to strike at Israel. Each of these groups has employed drones in a different way or to target various areas of the country. The types of drones used by the Houthis, Iraqi militias, and Hezbollah appear to have similar capabilities and characteristics, and they are all influenced by Iran’s backing for these groups.”
