1) The ITIC provides information about ‘The pro-Iranian Militias in Iraq’.
“So far (November 3, 2024), the Islamic Resistance in Iraq has issued 242 claims of responsibility for attacks against more than 285 targets in Israel, mostly using drones and several cruise missiles. In addition, 12 attacks were carried out in cooperation with the Houthis in Yemen. More than half of the attacks targeted sites in Eilat, the Golan Heights, and Haifa. Drones launched from Iraq have caused the deaths of two IDF soldiers, injuries to several soldiers and civilians, and property damage.”
2) At The Long War Journal, David Daoud and Ahmad Sharawi analyse ‘Hezbollah’s Unit 4400’.
“On October 1, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced the killing of Mohammad Jaafar Qasir, a high-value Hezbollah operative who commanded the group’s Unit 4400—the body responsible for transporting weapons from Iran and its proxies to Hezbollah in Lebanon. The Israeli strike focused attention on this shadowy unit whose activities are vital to Hezbollah’s battle-readiness.”
3) At the INSS, Yoel Guzansky and Orna Mizrahi discuss ‘The Increasing Qatari Involvement in Lebanon’.
“During the war between Israel and Hezbollah, Qatar’s efforts to leverage the situation in Lebanon became evident. Even before Israel’s ground incursion into Lebanon on October 1, it was reported that the United States had asked Qatar to help facilitate a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hezbollah. Qatar’s growing involvement is also possible because most Arab countries, especially the wealthy Gulf states, have been reluctant to engage in Lebanon, mainly due to the increasing influence of Iran-backed Hezbollah and the perception of Lebanon as a “bottomless pit” in need of endless aid. Qatar, however, views this lack of regional involvement as an opportunity to increase its influence, utilizing its good relations with both Iran and the United States.”
4) At WINEP, Patrick Clawson and Michael Knights explain ‘How to Judge Iranian Response Options Against Israel’.
“Iranian officials at all levels have a well-established track record of ignoring reality and expressing fantastical assessments of various events. This includes officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), even intelligence personnel, who at times display astonishing ignorance about how the world works. And there is good reason to believe such officials dissemble to the regime’s top leadership about important matters, whether or not they believe these rosy assessments themselves.”
5) UKLFI will hold a webinar titled “UNRWA: What Have We Learned and What Will Happen?” on Sunday, November 10th with Einat Wilf and Adi Schwartz.
“On 28 October 2024, the Knesset passed two Bills regarding UNRWA. The first, passed by a majority of 92-10 of the Knesset’s 120 members, prohibits any activity by UNRWA within Israel. The second, passed by 87-9, ends the agreement between Israel and UNRWA and prohibits any contact between Israeli government agencies or representatives and UNRWA as from 3 months following the enactment of the Bill.
The legislation has been fiercely criticised by UN bodies and Western governments, mainly on the ground that UNRWA is needed to provide humanitarian relief to Palestinians. However, Palestinians have complained that “the laws aim to liquidate the issue of refugees and their right to return”.”
Registration here.
