1) At WINEP, Hanin Ghaddar analyses ‘Hezbollah Post October 7’.
“In Lebanon, there is the pre and post pagers Hezbollah. Before the pagers incident, when thousands of pagers used by Hezbollah members exploded at the same time, Hezbollah was still convinced that it had some leverage over the Israeli and American governments—that its calculated attacks against the north of Israel had been successful and deterring. Post the pagers explosions—followed by the assassination of its leader Hassan Nasrallah, and many others that followed—Hezbollah realized that they were more exposed than they ever imagined, and that Israel was no longer deterred. That was also the moment when they realized it was too late to decouple the Lebanese and Gaza fronts—Israel was going all the way.”
2) At The Long War Journal, David Daoud advises ‘Don’t bet on the Lebanese Army to restrain Hezbollah’.
“The order for LAF to disarm Hezbollah must also come from the cabinet, Lebanon’s true executive power, which sets government policy in “all fields” and controls the armed forces. The process of selecting a prime minister—whose cabinet’s policy statement will then have to win the confidence of parliament or else be powerless—will also take time and is not guaranteed to succeed in the first round. Under the best of circumstances, this time-consuming process will allow Hezbollah a further opportunity to recuperate—and it is far from clear that the current constellation of parliamentary forces is even ready to elect a president or endorse a cabinet that wishes to act against Hezbollah.”
3) Jonathan Schanzer discusses ‘Assad End in Syria’ at Commentary.
“The most powerful fighting force behind the routing of the Assad regime is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Formerly known as the Nusra Front, this is al-Qaeda’s affiliate group in Syria. It underwent a facelift in 2016, upon the urging of the Qatari regime, which sought to put a kinder, gentler face on the Islamist group (among others, including Hamas in 2017).
There is no reason to believe that this group is moderate, let alone pragmatic. Some might point to the patronage of nominal American allies Qatar and Turkey as reason to hold out hope. But it is worth remembering that Qatar, even though it is a “Major Non-NATO ally” of the United States, is a sponsor of Hamas, Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and even the Islamic State.”
4) At the Alma Center, Tal Beeri asks ‘Who are you? “Abu Muhammad Al-Julani” the Jihadist or the Moderate Ahmed Hussein Al-Shara?’.
“However, there are those who doubt these intentions and statements. Those who are skeptical believe that the flexibility and aspiration for change are nothing more than a ploy by which Al-Julani seeks to present himself and his organization as a party acceptable to the international community and regional powers, and on the other hand, to gain the affection and faith of the diverse Syrian society on its religious, ethnic, and ethnic spectrum.”
5) The Tikva Fund provides a five-part series of lectures by Einat Wilf on Zionism and anti-Zionism.
“For the first time in many decades, the debate between Zionism and anti-Zionism seems to be at the center of public discourse throughout America and the West. But what are the fundamental beliefs, assumptions, and narratives behind these two opposing ideas? In this series, join Dr. Einat Wilf, a former member of Israel’s parliament and a scholar of Zionist thought for a comprehensive look at the history of Zionism—political, social, and religious—and the schools of anti-Zionism that have opposed it.”
