1) The ITIC reports that ‘Captured documents reveal how Iran smuggles weapons via Syria and Jordan’.
“Documents captured from Hamas during the war in the Gaza Strip expose Iran’s aerial, maritime and overland routes to smuggle weapons to Syria, Lebanon, and Judea and Samaria. Some documents related to the arrest in Jordan of a smuggling network affiliated with Hamas and showed how Hamas and Iran transfer weapons to Judea and Samaria in hopes of igniting yet another front against Israel.”
2) The Alma Center provides ‘Analysis of the Lebanese Army’s Activity – Marking One Month of Ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel’.
“A month has passed since the commencement of the ceasefire, during which LAF units primarily operated in the south of the country to remove unexploded ordnance, clear rubble, and open roads. The Lebanese Army issued a series of statements condemning Israel’s actions in Lebanon, accusing them of violating the agreement, and demanding that the IDF withdraw from Lebanon before the agreed-upon 60-day timeframe. These statements do not include any reference to Hezbollah’s activity, nor do they condemn Hezbollah’s violations; (according to IDF figures, Hezbollah had committed 47 violations as of December 27). At the same time, there appears to be no action by the Lebanese Army against Hezbollah’s terror infrastructure in southern Lebanon or its efforts to rebuild.”
3) At The Long War Journal, Ahmad Sharawi supplies ‘Profiles of new Syrian military leadership’.
“On December 21, Abu Mohammad Jolani, also known as Ahmad al Sharaa, convened a meeting with numerous leaders of Syrian armed factions and local figures to discuss plans for unifying these militias into a new Syrian army. The official statement described the meeting as “a gathering of Commander Ahmad Al-Shar’a and military factions to discuss the structure of the military institution in the new Syria.”
However, the statement did not disclose the identities of the attendees. FDD’s Long War Journal has identified and profiled 13 of those who participated.”
4) At the INSS, Gallia Lindenstrauss analyses ‘Israel’s Kurdish Dilemmas’.
“Many regard Assad’s overthrow as a tremendous achievement for Turkey, which stood out in its opposition to the Assad regime and armed the organizations rebelling against him. However, the Turkish government’s policy toward Syria is complex because it also involves Turkey’s approach to its Kurdish minority, which constitutes about a fifth of the country’s population. Before Assad was defeated, attempts to renew a dialogue with PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, currently held in solitary confinement in Turkey, had begun. The Turkish government believes that weakening the PYD in northeast Syria could diminish the PKK’s bargaining power. It seems that Turkey is strongly tempted to act—either indirectly through the SNA or directly via a Turkish military operation—to roll back the gains achieved by the Kurds since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, particularly as those gains are perceived by the West as the result of the SDF’s contribution to the territorial defeat of the Islamic State.”
5) At the JST, Ehud Ya’ari discusses ‘A Fateful Debate in Tehran’.
“One should pay attention to – and not dismiss as sheer pretense – Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s statement that the Islamic Revolution “doesn’t employ proxies” and that the different factions of the Axis of Resistance stand on their own feet and chart their course of action independently. In my opinion, this was a loaded signal to Iran’s clients in the Middle East that they should not expect Tehran to rush to their rescue. Iran was content to let Arabs fight and die for its cause but is not willing to sacrifice its own soldiers and interests in order to bolster severely weakened junior allies. The performance of Hizbullah, Hamas and the other factions in Gaza, as well as the Syrian Army and its auxiliary units, have all bitterly disappointed their Iranian mentors.”
