1) The ITIC reports on ‘Turkey as a Center for Hamas Activity’.
“Turkey, under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is one of Hamas’ most important strategic allies, especially since the violent events of the Mavi Marmara flotilla in 2010. Turkey hosts senior Hamas figures, some of whom have received Turkish citizenship, and provides political, diplomatic and propaganda support, as well as economic and humanitarian assistance.
Hamas has established one of its most important overseas centers in Turkey, primarily operated by prisoners released in the Gilad Shalit exchange deal of 2011. It uses Turkey to plan terrorist attacks and transfer funds to finance terrorist activities inside Israel, in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, and to raise and launder money in support of its terrorist operations, including the October 7, 2023, attack and massacre.”
2) At The Long War Journal, David Daoud discusses the recent seizure at Beirut airport of cash bound for Hizballah.
“It remains an open question whether Beirut’s tightened airport controls or its seizure of the $2.5 million portend a long-term and consistent change in how Lebanon will deal with funds destined for Hezbollah, or whether it is a temporary measure aimed at shorter-term goals. If Lebanon acts in good faith, it’s also uncertain whether authorities will be able to seize all incoming cash transfers and how many will get through.
January statements by Ankara’s authorities denied a smuggling issue existed, indicating Turkey is unlikely to be cooperative on the matter. In addition, Iran utilizes other conduits to support Hezbollah.”
3) The Alma Center provides a special report on the Lebanese Army.
“The LAF has been undergoing significant demographic shifts, leading to a trend of ‘Shi’ization.’ This shift is driven by Lebanon’s natural demographic changes and the abolition of mandatory military conscription. Hezbollah benefits from this transformation, as it seeks to fill the ranks of the LAF with members from its own Shi’ite sect. […]
The Shi’ization of the LAF affects the degree of cooperation between its soldiers and officers with Hezbollah, increasing Hezbollah’s influence over the Lebanese military.”
4) At the INSS, Raz Zimmt analyses ‘Lessons in Iran from Developments in Ukraine’.
“Iran’s responses to the talks between the United States and Russia on the future of the war in Ukraine, as well as the confrontation between Presidents Trump and Zelenskyy, reflect internal divisions within the country’s two main political camps. The hardliners view the recent developments as reinforcing their position that the United States cannot be trusted. They argue that Iran must strengthen its strategic partnership with Russia and safeguard its strategic military assets, including its nuclear capabilities. In contrast, the pragmatic-reformists, who have previously expressed reservations about Iran’s growing dependence on Russia and China, are increasingly concerned that closer ties between Moscow and Washington could come at Iran’s expense.”
5) Norman JW Goda discusses ‘The Genocide Libel: How the World Has Charged Israel with Genocide’.
“Genocide accusations against Israel are different. First, Israel, unlike other states, has been charged with genocide throughout its existence. The genocide accusation is tied to charges of racism, colonialism, and other accusations leveled against Israel since the 1960s. Second, the speed and fury with which the accusations exploded after the Hamas massacres of October 7, 2023, are unusual in the annals of lawfare. And yet regarding Israel’s 2023 war against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, there has been not only a rush to judgment but an effort to redefine genocide itself so that the constitutive elements of the crime itself are lowered.”
