1) At the Alma Center, Tal Beeri asks ‘Will the Palestinians in Lebanon Disarm?’.
“…it appears that while the disarmament process geographically targets eight refugee camps across Lebanon, only the Fatah organization, represented by Abu Mazen, has, in principle, expressed its general agreement to the process. Even after coordination and agreements, it remains unclear whether groups within Fatah, on the one hand, and other Palestinian organizations, on the other, will hand over their weapons.”
2) At WINEP, Farzin Nadimi discusses Iran’s ‘overlooked arsenal’.
“During negotiations for the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the United States and other countries made numerous efforts to incorporate limits on Iran’s nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. In the end, however, the agreement remained focused on nuclear activities, leaving the missile program largely untouched. The perils of this omission have become glaringly evident in recent years and could further darken the security and nonproliferation picture in the Middle East—and beyond—if a new deal takes the same approach.”
3) The ITIC reports on documents found by the IDF in the Gaza Strip relating to Khaled Mashal.
“Hamas documents found by the IDF during the war in the Gaza Strip provided evidence of power struggles in the movement’s upper echelons. The documents described how the “internal” leadership, led by Yahya al-Sinwar, sought to weaken Mashal’s influence in the Hamas decision-making centers, especially during the promotion of military plans to implement the vision of “the destruction of Israel” after Operation Guardian of the Walls in May 2021.”
4) At the FDD, David Daoud explains ‘What Lebanon’s municipal election results mean for Hezbollah’.
“Mere momentum should not be equated with long-term progress towards stabilization, particularly with respect to Hezbollah’s disarmament. The municipal election results did not demonstrate the prominent militant group’s outright dominance over Lebanon’s Shiites. However, Hezbollah nevertheless retains preponderant popularity among them and influence over their electoral and political choices. However, as Hezbollah dubbed them, these elections were a “promotional event” for the real prize: the May 2026 legislative elections. If the group can then expand upon its recent electoral success, and if Aoun’s interminable dialogue with Hezbollah over its arms ever becomes serious, then it can leverage its popular and political weight to steer those discussions toward an outcome allowing it to retain its arms.”
5) At the JCFA, Maurice Hirsch explains ‘The Danger of Attempting to Breach a Maritime Blockade’.
“After Israel prevented the Mavi Marmara from attempting to breach the maritime blockade of Gaza, the United Nations Secretary-General appointed a Panel of Inquiry to examine the events.
In its report, after examining the circumstances, the Panel of Inquiry concluded “that Israel’s naval blockade was legal.”
Summing up the danger of attempting to breach a legal maritime blockade, the UN Panel of Inquiry added:
Once a blockade has been lawfully established, it needs to be understood that the blockading power can attack any vessel breaching the blockade if after prior warning the vessel intentionally and clearly refuses to stop or intentionally and clearly resists visit, search or capture. There is no right within those rules to breach a lawful blockade as a right of protest.”
