1) At the INSS Raz Zimmt discusses ‘The Israel–Iran War: Concluded but not Resolved’.
“The fragile ceasefire between Iran and Israel marks the end of the current—and thus far most severe—phase in the ongoing hostilities between the Islamic Republic and Israel. Israel can conclude this phase of the conflict with a degree of satisfaction: even if Iran still retains a stockpile of uranium enriched to 60%—which it possessed before the campaign and may have transferred to hidden locations—its nuclear program has been significantly set back. Conversely, Iran is expected to portray the battle as a success, regardless of its military outcomes.”
2) David Albright and Spencer Faragasso provide ‘Post-Attack Assessment of the First 12 Days of Israeli and U.S. Strikes on Iranian Nuclear Facilities’.
“The Institute has obtained high-resolution commercial satellite imagery of the principal nuclear sites, including the Natanz Nuclear Complex, Fordow site, the Esfahan (Isfahan) Nuclear Complex, Lavisan 2 (also known has the Mojdeh Site, the former location of the SPND HQ and other facilities), the new SPND HQ, TABA/TESA Karaj Centrifuge Manufacturing Site, the IR-40 Arak Heavy Water Reactor and Heavy Water (D20) Production Plant, and Sanjarian (a former AMAD site that had recently shown signs of reactivation). The imagery shows various levels of damage and/or destruction at each site.”
3) At the ICT, Eitan Azani and Daniel Haberfeld look at ‘Hezbollah’s Quiet Front: Absent from the War It Was Meant to Fight’.
“Amid the escalating conflict between Israel and Iran, Hezbollah has remained militarily passive, relying on rhetoric and symbolic gestures over direct engagement. This calculated restraint underscores the organization’s strategic vulnerabilities—domestic opposition, operational setbacks, and deep reliance on Iranian support. The central question now is whether Hezbollah will ultimately choose to enter the war. What is clear is that, as of June 2025, Hezbollah is focused above all on ensuring its own survival.”
4) At CT, Brian Carter notes ‘The Deafening Silence of Iran’s Proxies’.
“The lack of a meaningful response from the so-called “Axis of Resistance” to the Israel-Iran war reveals how exhausted it is after months of fighting the United States and Israel. Iranian proxy and partner militias appear either unable or unwilling to support Iran in any serious way. Hezbollah and Hamas are probably unable. The Houthis and Iraqi militias appear largely unwilling. These groups remain capable of threatening US interests in the Middle East, of course. But the extent to which these groups have remained largely uninvolved so far reflects an unravelling of the Iranian regional militia network, which has long been considered the primary Iranian means of retaliating against adversary attacks.”
5) Joseph Epstein analyses ‘Turkey and Israel – Cooperation through Gritted Teeth’ at the Moshe Dayan Center.
“Turkey is trying to accomplish several objectives that could be threatened by a worsening of relations with Israel. Ankara seeks to improve relations with US President Donald Trump, create a stable Syria capable of returning the three million Syrian refugees in Turkey who fled the civil war in the 2010’s, erode the influence of the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG) in the Northeast of Syria and keep its ally Azerbaijan protected from Iranian influence.”
6) On July 7th UKLFI will hold a webinar titled ‘7 October and the War of Return’.
“In 2018 Dr Einat Wilf and Dr Adi Schwartz wrote a seminal book, titled “The War of Return”, which identified the supposed “right of return” of Palestinian “refugees” to Israel as the fundamental obstacle to peace between Israelis and Palestinians. Their analysis has had a major impact on the development of Israeli policy towards UNRWA. They have now updated and expanded their book, reflecting on the massacre of 7 October 2023 and arguing that it was carried out in the name of the Palestinian idea of “return”.”
Registration here.
