1) At the Atlantic Council, Fatima Abo Alasrar discusses ‘Iran, China, Russia, and the collapse of deterrence in the Red Sea’.
“This violence didn’t emerge from nowhere. It filled a vacuum the West created through miscalculations like the 2018 Stockholm Agreement, which legitimized Houthi control over key Red Sea ports while the United Nations (UN) celebrated diplomatic “progress.” The resulting confusion between diplomatic theater and strategic reality became a recurring pattern in which the West consistently chose containment over confrontation, a pattern that has proven recurring.
That pattern held until the Houthis revealed their hand on October 7, 2023. Their simultaneous campaign against maritime commerce and Israel demonstrated the operational coordination Tehran had cultivated among its proxies. By framing maritime terrorism as Palestinian solidarity, the Houthis sought to legitimize economic warfare while exposing the West’s vulnerability to asymmetric threats.”
2) At the FDD, David Daoud reports on recent steps taken by the Lebanese Central Bank.
“Lebanon’s Central Bank (Banque Du Liban or BDL) issued a circular on July 15 that effectively banned Lebanese financial institutions from dealing with Al Qard Al Hassan (AQAH), Hezbollah’s de facto banking and loans institution. BDL’s move is a step in the right direction for a country that has long suffered from financial corruption and economic stagnation, and whose massive shadow economy is a terror financing hub. However, the move’s impact is likely to be largely symbolic, and more is required of Beirut to curb Hezbollah and its finances.”
3) At Ynet, Michael Milshtein provides a profile of Hamas’ most senior figure in Gaza.
“He’s not as dominant as Mohammed Deif or Yahya Sinwar, but after surviving six Israeli assassination attempts and emerging from a decimated leadership, Izz al-Din Al-Haddad—known by his nickname “The Ghost”—has become Hamas’ most senior figure in Gaza. Once a Fatah operative, Al-Haddad switched sides in prison and now reportedly holds veto power within Hamas.”
4) At the INSS, Carmit Valensi analyses ‘The Bloody Clash in Sweida: Strategic Dilemmas for Israel’.
“Thus far, substantial evidence has emerged indicating the involvement of the regime’s security forces in the massacres. According to local reports, some of the forces sent to Sweida brutally attacked and killed Druze civilians, accompanied by looting and setting fire to homes in Druze villages. This pattern mirrors earlier clashes with the Alawite community in March 2025, when forces associated with al-Sharaa were accused of massacring hundreds of Alawite civilians in northwestern Syria—an act of sectarian revenge against supporters of the old regime. A similar pattern reappeared during clashes with the Druze community in late April.”
5) The Alma Center reports on ‘Rehabilitation of the Dahieh’.
“One of the main problems in the reconstruction process is the issue of funding. The Lebanese government has not been able to activate the $250 million emergency loan from the World Bank, due to reforms that have not yet been implemented. At the same time, the total cost of rebuilding the South, the Dahieh, and the Beqaa is estimated at between 6 and 11 billion dollars, dozens of times more than the financial resources currently available to the government.”
