1) At the Alma Center, Sarit Zehavi discusses ‘The Decision of the Lebanese Government to Disarm Hezbollah – Reality or Fantasy?’.
“Another critical issue is the fate of the weapons collected—will they be destroyed under international supervision, or will they eventually be returned to Hezbollah? We know of numerous cases in the past in which the Lebanese Armed Forces returned weapons they had located to Hezbollah. It is unclear whether the Barak Framework addresses this question.”
2) Fatima Abo Alasrar explains ‘Why the Houthis Care About Hezbollah’s Disarmament: The Logic of Transnational Resistance’.
“The universalization is systematic. When Houthi media figure Abd al-Hafez Moajeb frames Lebanon’s disarmament debate as part of Yemen’s anti-Western struggle – “The Yemeni scene cannot be ignored, which represented a real shock to the axis of global hegemony” – he’s transforming a Lebanese political issue into a universal battle against Western power. Every local struggle becomes part of the same existential fight.”
3) MEMRI reports on opposition in Qatar to a call to disarm Hamas.
“In late July and early August 2025, a number of journalists, influencers, and Islamic scholars in Qatar and affiliated with Qatar voiced opposition to the United Nations High-Level International Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution, held July 28-30 in New York at the initiative of France and Saudi Arabia. They objected in particular to the conference’s concluding statement, which included a call for disarming Hamas and terminating its rule in the Gaza Strip, and a condemnation of its October 7, 2023 invasion and massacres in southern Israel, which Hamas calls the Al-Aqsa Flood.”
4) NGO Monitor reports on ‘European Government Funding for Programs Involving Hamas-Controlled Ministry’.
“Since seizing control of Gaza in 2007, Hamas has employed a number of methods to divert international humanitarian aid to expand its military infrastructure, pay salaries, and cement its rule.
This aid diversion, including from NGOs, was central to Hamas’ preparations for the October 7th attacks, including the massive construction of tunnels and other terror-linked installations, and stockpiling supplies and resources. After thousands of terrorists invaded Israel and committed mass atrocities, Hamas continued to commandeer aid, taking advantage of a black market.
As part of this organized scheme, the Hamas-controlled Gaza Ministry of Social Development (MoSD) provided lists of beneficiaries to UN agencies and NGOs implementing cash-assistance and voucher projects.”
5) At The Long War Journal, Ahmad Sharawi reports that ‘Turkey ramps up military support for Syria’.
“On August 13, the Turkish Ministry of Defense announced that Turkish Minister of Defense Yasar Guler and Syrian Minister of Defense Murhaf Abu Qusra signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) regarding the training of Syrian troops and a military consultancy after talks in Ankara. […]
The agreement comes after a request by the Syrian government back in July for “official support from Türkiye to strengthen its defense capacity and combat terror groups” following the deadly clashes between the government forces, Arab Sunni tribes, and Druze militants in southern Syria.”
6) At the JISS, Dr Arial Admoni looks at how ‘Qatar Positions Itself as Washington’s Preferred Mediator’.
“The central problem with Qatar’s mediation is that it often fails to adopt a genuine middle-ground position — a basic requirement for any mediator seeking a formula acceptable to both sides. Instead, Doha tends to side with the demands of the terrorist party and work to advance them. During negotiations with Hamas, Qatar has put its propaganda apparatus at the group’s disposal while its officials have sharply attacked Israel and promoted diplomatic and legal action against it.”
