1) At WINEP, Neomi Neumann discusses ‘Hamas’s “Rigid Pragmatism”: Between Tactical Flexibility and Ideological Intransigence’.
“At the same time, it is worth remembering that any international effort to stabilize Gaza must be precise, resistant to circumvention, and grounded in a clear understanding of Hamas’s operational logic. Rigid pragmatism is not a sign of moderation—it is a strategy of survival, power preservation, and gradual consolidation. Even when Hamas agrees to temporary arrangements, it ensures it retains the ability to rebuild its strength—whether through an extended ceasefire (hudna), transitional governments, technocratic committees, or indirect political structures. For Hamas, time is a strategic asset.”
2) At the JISS, Avi Tal analyses ‘The Future of President Trump’s Gaza Plan in Palestinian Eyes’.
“Palestinian officials and commentators have spoken extensively about the future of President Trump’s plan for Gaza. It is evident that they wish to advance the plan according to their own interpretation—one that differs markedly from the Israeli, and likely also the American, understanding. Within the Palestinian arena, each faction highlights its own priorities for how the plan should move forward. One point, however, is clear: the notion of Gaza’s armed groups surrendering their weapons, which is central for Israel and, possibly, to the United States as well, encounters broad opposition among Palestinians.”
3) At the ITIC, Dr Igal Shiri reports that ‘The Palestinian Authority prepares to administer the Gaza Strip after the war’.
“In ITIC assessment, the PA can be expected to play a significant role in the committee for administering the Strip, despite Israel’s public opposition and American ambiguity, as part of the understanding being formed by Fatah and Hamas, which seeks to demonstrate that it complies with the ceasefire terms. However, in all probability the dispute over the disarmament of Hamas and other “resistance” factions will continue, given Hamas’ refusal to disarm, directly opposed to the PA position that it should hold a monopoly on weapons.”
4) At the Jerusalem Post, Jonathan Conricus argues that ‘UNRWA should not be included in a future Gaza’.
“Long before the October 7 attack against Israel, the agency’s schools have been poisoning the minds of generations of Palestinian youth, systematically glorifying death and martyrdom, indoctrinating them to pursue a genocidal jihad against the Jews, while aspiring to annihilate the State of Israel.
This is evident from UNRWA textbooks, ceremonies, plays, and performances where Gaza children were dressed up as Hamas terrorists abducting and killing Israeli civilians.”
5) On Monday, November 17th, UKLFI will hold a webinar titled ‘Must Israel Cooperate with UNRWA?’.
“On 29 October 2024 Israel’s parliament (the Knesset) passed legislation by overwhelming bi-partisan majorities prohibiting any contact between Israeli State Authorities and UNRWA as well as any activity of UNRWA on Israeli territory. More recently, the US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, has said that UNRWA “became a subsidiary of Hamas” and is not going to play any role in humanitarian supplies to the Gaza Strip. This follows numerous reports over the years by the NGO, UN Watch, containing evidence of extensive infiltration of UNRWA by Hamas obtained from open sources. However, on 22 October 2025 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) provided a non-binding advisory opinion to the UN General Assembly which concluded that Israel must cooperate with UNRWA and other UN agencies.
In this webinar Dr Hiller Neuer, Executive Director of UN Watch, and Natasha Hausdorff, Legal Director of UKLFI Charitable Trust, will discuss how the ICJ reached its conclusion and the implications for Israel, Gaza, UNRWA and International Law itself.”
Registration here.
