1) The Alma Center provides a special report on ‘One Year Since the Ceasefire in Lebanon’.
“Despite repeated statements by the Lebanese government and the Lebanese Army regarding the success of the operation to disarm Hezbollah south of the Litani (in early November the Lebanese government claimed that the Lebanese Army had completed 85% of the disarmament south of the Litani and was expected to complete it by the end of the year), it appears that the situation on the ground is far from this, to say the least.”
2) At the ITIC, Avishai Karo documents ‘Hamas’ Battle for Hearts and Minds after the Ceasefire Agreement in the Gaza Strip’.
“In ITIC assessment, Hamas’ relatively moderate and cautious media products are the result of its desire to tiptoe through this period, which is sensitive for it, while continuing to wage a narrative offensive for three reasons: one, strengthening civilian and security governance in the Strip before progressing to the next stages of the ceasefire agreement. According to public statements made by senior Hamas figures they want to move forward, but it is still unclear to what extent that will be translated into action on the ground, at least in the foreseeable future. Two, the movement’s desire to prevent a confrontation with the states supervising the implementation of the agreement. Three, Hamas’ understanding that after two years of war, the dire humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip is incompatible with “victory celebrations,” which could damage its image at a time when it has to struggle for its existence in general and for its future as a controlling and influential actor in the Gaza Strip in particular.”
3) MEMRI reports that ‘Hamas And Palestinian Islamic Jihad Threaten The International Force That Is To Deploy In Gaza And Disarm Them’.
“Following the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 2803 on November 17, 2025, which is based on U.S. President Trump’s 20-point plan and calls for the deployment of an “International Stabilization Force” (ISF) in Gaza – tasked inter alia with “the permanent decommissioning of weapons from non-state groups” and “the destruction of military, terror, and offensive infrastructure” – Hamas and the other Palestinian terror organizations declared their opposition to major clauses of the resolution, and threatened to regard the ISF as a “foreign occupying force” and fight it.”
4) At the INSS Amira Oron analyses ‘The Egyptian Agenda and Relations with Israel in the Shadow of the War in the Gaza Strip’.
“The war has posed a significant test for Egyptian–Israeli relations. At the same time, Egypt’s leadership has had to consider its domestic political and economic agenda—already burdened with challenges—as it formulated its policy toward both the war and Israel. Understanding these two dimensions—Egypt’s position on the Palestinian issue and its internal challenges—helps explain Egypt’s policy toward Israel and the likely implications for relations between the two countries.”
5) NGO Monitor reports on ‘Europol Cooperating with Hezbollah-linked, ICC-Active Hind Rajab Foundation’.
“In response to an NGO Monitor inquiry, Europol stated that it “is maintaining and exploring cooperation with a number of stakeholders, including civil society organisations that collect and document alleged war crimes around the world,” adding that “Europol has also been in contact with the Hind Rajab Foundation (HRF)”. […]
On November 18, HRF provided additional details, stating that “On 22 October 2025, Europol invited the Hind Rajab Foundation (HRF) to speak at its annual meeting in The Hague.””
