1) At the HJS, Andrew Fox reports on ‘Cash to Terror: How Humanitarian Aid Funds Extremism’.
“Humanitarian aid is intended to save lives. But as Cash and Voucher Assistance (CVA) becomes one of the most widely used forms of relief globally, evidence is mounting that in certain conflict zones it is inadvertently fuelling the very forces it seeks to alleviate.
This report examines how CVA – the practice of giving money or vouchers to crisis-affected civilians in place of in-kind aid – operates in contexts where armed groups like Hamas, the Houthis, and Boko Haram exert significant control over markets, financial networks, and supply chains. By analysing documented case studies from Gaza, Yemen, northeast Nigeria and Sudan, we identify predictable mechanisms through which cash aid slides into extremist-linked economic systems.”
2) At WINEP, Michael Jacobson and Matthew Levitt discuss ‘Cutting Off Hamas’s European Fundraising Spigot’.
“As its actions make clear, Hamas is keen to maintain control and power in Gaza over the long term. But the group will need to rebuild its military and security capabilities to do so—a costly proposition. Drying out Hamas’s funds would help buttress the ceasefire in Gaza, allow time for alternative Palestinian leaders to emerge, and keep a dangerous group on the back foot. Unfortunately, Hamas’s overseas financial support networks remain largely intact. Cracking down on those networks—particularly those in Europe—will be essential as the international community seeks to stabilize and rebuild Gaza.”
3) The ITIC reports that ‘About 60% of the Gazans Classified as “Journalists” and Other Media Personnel Killed in the Gaza Strip War Belonged to Hamas and Other Terrorist Organizations’.
“According to information examined by the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center for the present study and the study published in February 2024, 266 individuals defined as “journalists and media personnel” were killed during the war in the Gaza Strip. The examination indicated that about 60% were members of or affiliated with terrorist organizations, primarily Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).
Prominent in the investigation was the finding that many had double roles, they were both military operatives and media personnel. That was particularly obvious in the cooperation between Hamas and Qatar’s Al Jazeera network. Loyalty to a media outlet and a terrorist organization not only undermines trust in media personnel and the credibility of their reporting, but alters the status of journalists under international law and places them in danger, since military forces find it difficult to distinguish between journalists and military operatives.”
4) At the INSS, Orna Mizrahi and Moran Levanoni analyse ‘A Year after the Ceasefire—Is Lebanon Truly Different?’.
“One year after the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon, the Lebanese arena is undergoing changes. These changes are reflected both in the internal balance of power between Lebanon’s new leadership and Hezbollah, as well as in the balance of power between the organization and the IDF, which has not relented and continues to weaken it. However, this opportunity for change is overshadowed by Hezbollah’s determination to recover and by the difficulties facing the Lebanese government, which remains weak as it attempts to compel the organization to relinquish its weapons and autonomous status.”
5) At The Moshe Dayan Center, Dr. Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak discusses ‘Turkey’s Diplomatic, Judicial and Public Diplomacy Campaign Against Israel’.
“The trajectory of Israeli-Turkish relations since the Hamas attack of 7 October illustrates a profound and deliberate political rupture driven by Ankara’s escalating delegitimization strategy. What began as rhetorical support for Hamas quickly evolved into a comprehensive policy framework aimed at undermining Israel’s moral, political, and even historical legitimacy. Through inflammatory discourse, systematic media narratives, suspension of trade, symbolic diplomatic sanctions, and active participation in international legal initiatives, the Turkish leadership signaled that it no longer seeks a functional normalization with Israel – even after the cessation of hostilities in Gaza. Instead, Ankara has recast Jerusalem not only as an adversary in the regional arena, but as a civilizational threat to Turkey’s security identity, thereby embedding anti-Israel sentiment deeply within both state institutions and public consciousness. This broader delegitimization framework is further reinforced by Ankara’s assertive “Jerusalem policy,” through which Erdoğan claims historical entitlements over Jerusalem and systematically contests Israel’s sovereignty in the city.”
