1) At the ICT, Dr Michael Barak analyses “Hamas’s “Al Aqsa Flood” Document: A Propaganda Narrative Two Years into the War in Gaza”.
“This document is a Hamas propaganda product, not a historical analysis. Hamas seeks to frame its actions as defensive, while the facts demonstrate otherwise: the deliberate targeting of civilians, kidnappings, the use of human shields, and the exploitation of schools, hospitals, and mosques as weapons depots are hallmarks of a terrorist organization, not of a liberation movement.
Hamas does not represent all Palestinians, neither in 2006 nor today. It suppresses opposition and denies freedom of expression. The narrative it seeks to embed in public consciousness is built on falsehoods, unverified data, and historical distortions.”
2) At the JISS, Avi Tal reports on “How the Palestinian Public Views Reform in the Palestinian Authority”.
“Since the publication of the Trump plan for Gaza—which conditions any future role for the Palestinian Authority in governing the Strip, as well as the renewal of a pathway toward Palestinian self-determination, on the implementation of reforms—Mahmoud Abbas has worked persistently to persuade foreign interlocutors that reforms within PA institutions are already underway. […]
By contrast, Palestinian commentators express deep skepticism regarding both the seriousness of the Authority’s reform efforts and their likelihood of success. In their assessment, the steps taken by the PA are merely cosmetic, driven primarily by international and Arab pressure.”
3) At the Middle East Forum, Saeid Golkar and Jason Brodsky explain “What’s New About This Wave of Protests in Iran”.
“The 2025-26 uprising is broader and deeper in its early phase. The protests have been more geographically widespread, encompassing major urban centers such as Tehran, Isfahan, Mashhad, and Hamedan and extending into smaller cities and economically marginalized areas. In 2022, however, particularly during the initial phases, protests took place mainly in major cities. The 2025-26 cycle, in its early stages, has also mobilized students, laborers, women, and ethnic minorities, suggesting the potential for broader mobilization amid unbearable economic conditions.”
4) Fatima Abo Alasrar discusses “Yemen’s South Between the Gulf Rift and the Southern Cause”.
“The STC cannot back down without losing its base. Saudi Arabia cannot relent without looking weak. The UAE cannot abandon its proxy without losing credibility everywhere else it operates. Everyone is locked in. It is not so clear whether further military escalation will take place. Recent years have proved that southern resistance often preferred quiet demonstrations, civil unrest, and isolation to expansion and confrontation.”
5) At the Moshe Dayan Center, Professor Ofra Bengio provides comparative analysis of “Post-Baʿth Iraq and Syria”.
“From what can be observed from the past two decades in Iraq and from what is taking place in Syria since December 2024, it seems that despite the upheaval, there is more continuity rather than a dramatic change in the mode of governance and the regime’s legitimacy. The explanation for this lies in the lack of experience of the new rulers, rampant corruption, the absence of democratic values, and a built-in fear of other minorities. Another important factor is the takeover of the mechanisms of government by terrorist organizations: in Iraq, al-Hashd al-Shaʿbi (the Popular Mobilization Forces) with its various offshoots, and in Syria, Hayʾat Tahrir al-Sham (Organization for the Liberation of the Levant or HTS), which has received a complete makeover in the West.”
