1) At the INSS, Raz Zimmt analyses the situation in Iran.
“Alongside growing criticism of the supreme leader, there has also been a significant erosion over the years in the standing of the clerical establishment as a whole. Processes of secularization in Iranian society—especially among the younger generation—together with the growing alienation many citizens feel toward clerics due to the politicization of the religious establishment since the revolution; the identification of clerics with a governing system perceived as failing and corrupt; the uncompromising positions of hardline clerics; and the relatively comfortable economic status of senior clerics—all have contributed to a marked decline in their standing and even to displays of public hostility toward clerics in the public sphere.”
2) At the JISS, Ari Heistein discusses ‘The Rise and Fall of Yemen’s STC’.
“One of the most puzzling features of the recent turmoil in southern Yemen is the scale of the Southern Transitional Council’s (STC) miscalculation. Over nearly a decade, the STC painstakingly built military forces under its umbrella, cultivated a domestic political constituency, and established diplomatic relationships abroad. Yet in the span of a single month, much of that investment evaporated, as the STC moved from what appeared to be a high-water mark since its establishment in 2017 to an abrupt denouement. […]
What compelled the STC to rush toward a decisive bid for independence while discounting the possibility of a Saudi reaction that would dismantle everything it had built? What does the STC’s dissolution mean for Yemen’s future?”
3) WINEP provides analysis of the situation in north-eastern Syria.
“IS detainees and their family members are held across several facilities in the northeast. Most women and minors are held in two detention camps: around 25,000 of them in al-Hol, and another 2,400 in the smaller Roj camp. Most of the 9,000 men and teenage boys in detention are held across twenty-five other facilities, which some have called the largest collection of terrorists in the world. All of these facilities have remained under SDF control for years, with military and financial support from the U.S.-led Global Coalition. Yet the SDF’s nonstate status meant that it could not hold trials for any detainees, deport the non-Syrians, or even engage with certain governments directly about their fate. And despite U.S. pressure, most countries have been reluctant to repatriate their citizens.”
4) At the Alma Center, Dr Zoe Levornik reports on ‘Lebanon’s Government’s Ongoing Failure in Confronting Hezbollah’.
“In August 2025, an official decision was adopted in Lebanon to disarm Hezbollah’s weapons, framed in terms of “the confiscation of weapons” (حصر السلاح) and “the monopoly of weapons by the state” (حصر السلاح بيد الدولة), and accompanied by a timetable for the disarmament process.
However, already in November–December 2025, the discourse began to change gradually and to soften. The terms “containment” or “confinement” (احتواء) began to replace the terms “disarmament” and “exclusivity.”
The terms “containment of weapons” or “confinement of weapons” were defined as a situation in which the weapons are stored, not used, not transferred or smuggled, and placed under supervision – but not confiscated. In practice, this means that the weapons remain in Hezbollah’s hands and under its full control.”
5) Also at the JISS, Benjamin Ames looks at ‘Europe’s Hamas Problem: Financing Networks, External Terrorist Plots, and the Italian Model’.
“The repeated convergence of senior Hamas-affiliated figures from different organizations at shared European forums illustrates how these entities interact through common platforms, reinforcing a broader, pan-European fundraising ecosystem. Individuals within this network, such as Hannoun, have spent decades embedding themselves within European civil society structures to advance Hamas’ foreign interests.”
