1) At the FDD, Ahmad Sharawi discusses The Mass Escape of ISIS Detainees.
“Al-Hol has only served as fertile ground for further indoctrination of its detainees, who were already radicalized. Their escape heightens the risk of ISIS regeneration and exposes the Syrian army’s limited authority on the ground. […]
No meaningful effort was ever undertaken to deradicalize these families. Instead, the permissive environment allowed extremist networks to deepen their influence, further cementing the hold of ISIS’s Islamist ideology.”
2) At the INSS, Tammy Caner and Galia Lindenstrauss analyse The Turkish Legal Campaign Against Israel.
“Since the war that erupted on October 7, a profound crisis has unfolded in Turkish–Israeli relations. One of the main manifestations of this crisis is the legal campaign Turkey is waging against Israel. Turkey is operating in this arena to entrench a lasting narrative of Israel’s culpability while refusing to recognize its security needs vis-à-vis a murderous terrorist organization and by portraying Israel as having violated international law, an act that must be punished. The Turkish moves have implications that go beyond the damage to bilateral relations between the two countries, as they knowingly contribute to Israel’s deteriorating standing and its growing diplomatic isolation in the international arena.”
3) At the JISS, Gabi Siboni and Erez Winner give their thoughts on The Day After Abu Mazen.
“Since the Oslo Accords (1993–1995), the Palestinian Authority has failed to establish a functioning governing framework. Instead, it has evolved into a corrupt body that incites and supports terrorism. One of the central problems is its policy paying stipends to the families of imprisoned terrorists (“Pay-for-Slay”). The system is structured on a graduated scale tied to the severity of the attack: the longer the prison sentence, the higher the monthly payment. Despite reports of supposed reforms, the policy has continued in practice, even during periods of economic crisis.”
4) At the ITIC, Yuval Rosenberg analyses The Reorganization of Hezbollah Leadership and the Resignation of Wafiq Safa.
“According to reports, at the beginning of February 2026, Hezbollah’s leadership accepted the resignation of Wafiq Safa, who had headed the Coordination and Liaison Unit since 1987 and was considered close to Hassan Nasrallah and one of the most prominent and influential figures in the organization’s top leadership. Media commentaries opined that he resigned because of his disputes with Qassem, but also noted that the move was part of the secretary general’s efforts to reorganize Hezbollah’s hierarchy by tightening his control over the organization’s media, and political and “security” forces, while relying on figures loyal to himself and with lower media prominence, in order to reduce the risk of being targeted by Israel.”
5) At the ICT, Daniel Haberfeld and Eitan Azani report on Hezbollah’s Use of Clan Networks in the Diaspora: the Fawaz Clan Case Study.
“The Fawaz clan demonstrates how Hezbollah utilizes extended family networks in the diaspora to support its financial and organizational infrastructure. By combining kinship ties, legitimate businesses, and roles within the Foreign Relations Department (FRD), the family links Shiite communities abroad to Hezbollah’s leadership in Lebanon. This case shows that terrorist financing is often embedded in social and familial structures, making it difficult to distinguish lawful activity from illicit support.”
Wishing Ramadan Kareem to all our readers currently marking the month.
