1) The ITIC provides insights on The Israel-Lebanon Ceasefire Agreement.
“In ITIC assessment, Hezbollah will continue to represent the ceasefire as a Hezbollah-Iran achievement while attempting to challenge IDF forces maintaining the agreement to be able to accuse Israel of “violating the agreement.” At the same time, Hezbollah can be expected to escalate internal criticism against the Lebanese leadership, which will raise the tension in Lebanon between Hezbollah’s supporters and opponents. The Lebanese government will try to use the momentum to advance direct talks with Israel and implement the state’s monopoly on weapons, especially applying its sovereignty in south Lebanon to convince the United States to pressure Israel to withdraw to the border.”
2) At the JCFA, Aviram Bellaishe explains why Hezbollah Remains the Central Barrier in Israel-Lebanon Negotiations.
“Both sides are talking because the problem is real: Hezbollah. Israel can name it directly. Lebanon cannot adopt a language that frames these talks as a partnership with Israel against Hezbollah without destroying its domestic legitimacy before they begin. The real challenge is not only what each side wants, but also defining the purpose of the negotiation without compromising it from the outset.
Hezbollah is simultaneously a Lebanese sovereignty problem and an Israeli security threat. There is a certain overlap of interests between Beirut and Jerusalem on the need to prevent Hezbollah from exercising independent military control over southern Lebanon. However, that overlap does not put the two sides on the same side.”
3) At the JISS, Dr Pnina Shuker and Dr Ariel Admoni discuss Gulf Divisions Over Iran’s Aggression.
“Throughout the forty days of Operation Roaring Lion / Epic Fury, Iran used ballistic missiles and UAVs against the Gulf states as a means of exerting indirect pressure on the United States to bring the fighting to an end. These strikes targeted not only U.S. military assets across the Gulf but also critical infrastructure and civilian sites. They did not stop with the ceasefire: Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates were hit on several occasions, and Qatar reported intercepting missiles directed toward its territory.
The pattern of attacks was uneven, both in scale and in intensity, and that disparity shaped how individual Gulf states responded. The initial Gulf reaction leaned toward restraint. Over time, however, as the attacks continued, that posture fractured. Some states began to push for a more forceful response, while others prioritized mediation efforts and the preservation of the status quo.”
4) At the ICT, Dr Michael Barak analyses Hamas’s Psychological Warfare Against Local Militias and Collaborators in the Gaza Strip.
“Since the events of October 7, 2023, Hamas has confronted a formidable domestic challenge: the emergence of local militias and collaborators within Gaza who contest its hegemony and challenge its status as the leading “resistance” force. In response, Hamas has launched a multi-faceted campaign that transcends conventional military action, employing sophisticated psychological and cognitive operations. By leveraging local tribal structures, Hamas seeks to delegitimize its rivals, subvert their narratives, and consolidate its territorial control.”
5) At UKLFI, Natasha Hausdorff discusses the status of journalists in armed conflicts.
“The conversation examines the distinction between civilians and combatants for the purposes of the law of armed conflict and the circumstances in which a person is to be regarded as a combatant and so a potentially legitimate target. It also explores how media reporting can differ from the facts, and the importance of verification and impartiality in conflict coverage.”
