1) The ITIC reports on the use of First Person View Drones against Israel.
“Hezbollah began limited use of FPV drones during the previous war against Israel (October 8, 2023-November 27, 2024). In the current war, which began on March 2, 2026, Hezbollah increased its use of explosive drones, and since the start of the ceasefire it has focused the attacks on IDF forces in south Lebanon.
Hezbollah reportedly operates workshops in south Lebanon and the Beqa’a Valley to assemble the drones, which cost only hundreds of dollars. It was also claimed that last year the Lebanese army seized a shipment of 5,000 drones which were smuggled into Lebanon, but dozens of other shipments have reached the organization.”
2) The INSS analyses Hezbollah’s Global Financial Network.
“Since the renewal of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah, Israel has struck bank branches and financial assets linked to the organization, including facilities associated with al-Qard al-Hassan. This institution, established in the 1980s as part of Hezbollah’s social services network, initially operated as a charitable body providing interest-free loans to the Shiite population in Lebanon. Over time, it evolved into Hezbollah’s primary financial institution, particularly following the collapse of Lebanon’s banking system after 2019. The institution expanded its operations despite international sanctions imposed by the United States since 2007, targeting entities and individuals connected to Hezbollah and its illicit business network. Today, al-Qard al-Hassan operates an extensive financial network that includes ATMs and gold-trading mechanisms and effectively serves as Hezbollah’s banking system.”
3) At The National Interest, Josh Birenbaum and Susan Soh explain How Iran’s Leaders Hide Their Billions.
“Iran’s leaders are giving a money-laundering masterclass on using the quirks of geography to jump jurisdictions, evade sanctions, and outwit detection. Iran’s new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, used these techniques to hide his estimated $3 billion in wealth. At the same time, the Iranian regime leverages the same strategies to move additional billions in illicit oil revenue, used to fund terror and missile attacks across the region.”
4) At The Long War Journal, Ahmad Sharawi and Ron Nuriely Kimel report on recent events in Syria.
“At its peak in 2017, Hezbollah, which entered the Syrian civil war in support of Assad’s regime, maintained roughly 7,000–10,000 fighters in Syria. While most of these individuals were Lebanese, the group also recruited Syrians, including units such as the “Golan File,” which was positioned in southern Syria near the Golan Heights to target Israel.
These cells have continued to operate in Syria despite the fall of the Assad regime. In April alone, Syrian authorities reportedly disrupted multiple Hezbollah-linked plots. On April 19, the Syrian Ministry of Interior announced that it had “thwarted a sabotage plot orchestrated by a cell linked to the terrorist Hezbollah militia” in Quneitra Governorate. According to the ministry, the operatives had disguised a civilian transport vehicle to conceal rocket-launching equipment for a surprise attack likely targeting Israel. The rockets reportedly bore the slogan, “Victory for our brothers in Lebanon and Palestine.””
5) At WINEP, Adrian Shtuni discusses Iran’s Hybrid Warfare in Europe.
“At the outset of the Iran war, many expected the regime to activate long-embedded sleeper cells abroad. Instead, a leaner, more disposable hybrid operational model has emerged, centered on the front entity Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiyah (HAYI). This model relies on the recruitment of non-ideological local residents—mainly youths with petty criminal backgrounds—via casual, gig-economy channels on Snapchat and Telegram. Recruits are offered modest cash incentives for low-complexity acts of violence and intimidation against Jewish communities and symbolic targets in Europe, using readily available materials. Although no fatalities have resulted from these claimed incidents so far, they have achieved measurable psychological and media effects.”
