1) At WINEP, David Schenker looks ‘Behind the US Plan to Prevent an All-Out Israel-Hezbollah War’.
“Hochstein’s proposed solution is to resuscitate and implement a modified version of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, the resolution that effectively ended the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war. Among other things, UNSCR 1701 was supposed to prevent Hezbollah from deploying south of the Litani River along the border with Israel after the end of the hostilities. But the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, or UNIFIL, lacked both the ability and the will to stop Hezbollah from reestablishing itself on the frontier.”
2) At the Alma Center, Tal Beeri asks ‘Will Shiite Militia Operatives Come to Lebanon as Reinforcements for Hezbollah During a War?’.
“Recently, there have been increasing numbers of reports regarding the scenario of thousands of Shiite militia operatives, operating under Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, preparing to physically arrive in Lebanon as reinforcements for Hezbollah if a full-scale war with Israel breaks out. Concrete statements have been made about the intention to fight alongside Hezbollah if war erupts, and that militia operatives from the Popular Mobilization Forces of Iraq (Hashd al-Shaabi), the Fatemiyoun Brigade, the Zainebiyoun Brigade, and the Yemenite Houthis could deploy to Lebanon to participate in the war.”
3) At the JCPA, Yoni Ben Menachem explains why ‘Hizbullah’s Hassan Nasrallah and Iran Plan a Mediterranean Naval Campaign Against Israel’.
“Nasrallah’s message is directed at all regional players in the Middle East and the international community supporting Israel. Some suspect that he, alongside Iran, plan to impose a significant naval blockade on Israel in the Mediterranean Sea.
Since the beginning of the war, Iran and Hizbullah have been preparing for this move, with the threat to Cyprus being part of Nasrallah’s plans.
Without an air force, Hizbullah relies on its large fleet of UAVs, aiming to neutralize the Israeli Air Force through two primary actions: a surprise attack with precision missiles and UAVs on Israeli Air Force bases and against radar and air defense facilities, including paralyzing Ben Gurion Airport.
Nasrallah’s goal is to ground Israeli aircraft to prevent them from conducting missions in Lebanon against mid- and long-range missile launchers.”
4) At the INSS, Sima Shine and Eldad Shavit discuss ‘Growing Concern Over Iran’s Nuclear Program’.
“In the ongoing conflict between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and following a resolution condemning Iran’s lack of cooperation with the agency, Tehran announced an increase in the number of centrifuges enriching uranium at the Fordow and Natanz sites, effectively declaring its intention to increase its stockpile of enriched uranium. With the current quantities, Iran could, within a month of making a decision, begin enriching to military levels and produce enough enriched material for eight nuclear devices. This raises significant questions about Iran’s nuclear strategy, particularly the possibility that it is now operating under a different logic than in the past and is practically striving to reach a point in the not-too-distant future where it could also advance steps needed to acquire nuclear weapons.”
5) At Quillette, Leon Hadar looks at ‘The Quincy Institute’s Middle East Fantasies’.
“The positions adopted by the think tank’s scholars during the war in Gaza are illustrative of its overall Middle East agenda: appease Iran and demonise Israel. From this, it follows that Palestinians are oppressed by Israel, which is systematically denying them their legitimate national rights. Quincy scholars argue that the US must therefore press Israel to withdraw from Gaza and end its occupation of the West Bank.”
6) At the BESA Center, Shaul Bartal documents ‘Changes in Hamas Perceptions of the Gaza War’.
“Hamas predicted that Israel would not enter the Gaza Strip for ground maneuvers and that the war that would break out as a result of its invasion of Israel would end swiftly. Surely, Hamas believed, the inevitable heavy international pressure on Israel would force it to stop fighting. Hamas also expected Israel to retreat to the October 6 lines while negotiating a wholesale release of Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the hundreds of Israeli hostages due to Israel’s high sensitivity to human life. All these expectations were disappointed. The death toll in the Gaza Strip is rising, most Hamas battalions have been disbanded and stripped of their military and organizational capabilities, and the Gaza Strip, which until recently was considered a land liberated by jihad, is being recaptured.”
