1) At The Long War Journal, Joe Truzman explains how and why’ Israel is targeting orchestrators of West Bank terrorism’.
“In 2021, Tehran made a calculated decision to increase funding and support for established terrorist organizations in the West Bank. Iranian leaders felt encouraged by the belief that the West Bank was vulnerable to unrest due to Hamas’s increasing popularity in the territory and a weakened Palestinian Authority (PA). Additionally, Iran likely recognized an opportunity to exploit the mutual distrust between the PA and the Israeli government, using this dynamic to further incite discord within the territory.”
2) At the JISS, Prof Hillel Frisch explains why ‘No Technology Can Substitute for an IDF Presence on the Gaza-Egyptian Border’.
“Advocates of a hostage deal that would require the IDF to withdraw from the Philadelphi Corridor that runs the length of the Gaza-Egyptian border suggest that technological solutions can effectively prevent the border from once again becoming Hamas’ military and economic lifeline. This assertion can be refuted on at least four grounds…”
3) At WINEP, David Schenker and Assaf Orion discuss ‘The Pros and Cons of Salvaging (or Ditching) UNIFIL’.
“Because Resolution 1701 was passed under Chapter VI (as opposed to Chapter VII) of the UN Security Council bylaws, it is not enforceable militarily—its application is entirely dependent on cooperation from Israel and Lebanon. For years, however, Beirut has failed to honor these obligations. Far from helping the UN enforce 1701, the LAF has consistently deconflicted and collaborated with Hezbollah while obstructing UNIFIL’s access. Most recently, the LAF temporarily suspended joint patrols with UNIFIL last week after peacekeepers entered “private property” (usually code for Hezbollah locations) in the village of Kfar Hamam.”
4) At the JCFA (formerly JCPA), Yoni Ben Menachem asks ‘Who Will Replace Hizbullah Chief of Staff Fuad Shukr?’.
“In his speech on August 26, 2024, Hassan Nasrallah did not disclose the identity of Shukr’s permanent replacement. It is possible that no decision has been made yet or that Hizbullah is concealing the successor’s identity to prevent another targeted assassination by Israel. […]
Shiite sources in Lebanon indicate that appointing a permanent replacement for Fuad Shukr requires coordination with Iran’s Revolutionary Guards.
It is believed that Nasrallah will seek a veteran with a history of “Jihad against Israel” to fill the role. However, finding a figure comparable to Imad Mughniyeh and Fuad Shukr—both of whom were eliminated—will be challenging.”
5) At the Times of Israel, Amir Bar Shalom looks at ‘Why Nasrallah scaled down his Sunday attack, and why Israel had limited its pre-emption’.
“Hezbollah’s ostensible attack on the Glilot base — which was not in fact impacted — was depicted by Nasrallah as the main achievement of its revenge assault, but with a very specific stress on that base being north of Tel Aviv. His point, and this was for outside consumption, was that Hezbollah had been careful not to fire directly on Tel Aviv, lest the symmetry Nasrallah has himself previously drawn, whereby a strike on Beirut is considered equivalent to a strike on Tel Aviv, would be used against him.”
6) At the INSS, Ofir Winter and Udi Dekel ask ‘How Can Arab States Contribute to Advancing a Ceasefire in Gaza?’.
“Since Hamas’s attack on October 7, the leaders of the Arab world have faced a complex challenge. Moderate Arab states, including Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, strongly oppose Hamas’s path of “resistance” and its ties to the Iranian axis. They desire the expulsion of Hamas from the Gaza Strip and identify—even if only privately—with the aims of Israel’s war. At the same time, however, these views are rarely shared publicly, as the prevailing discourse among the Arab public remains largely supportive of Hamas. As a result, while Hamas faces continuous military pressure from Israel, it has not been subjected to the necessary concurrent pressure from the Arab public. This situation has allowed the organization to operate under the belief that it enjoys support from the Arab street, which has strengthened Hamas’s reluctance to compromise.”
