On September 18th – the day after the explosions of Hizballah pagers in Lebanon and Syria – the BBC News website began promoting framing concerning the timing of those events which was based entirely on anonymous claims appearing in reports published on the same day by two particular media sources: Axios and Al Monitor.
The relevant BBC reports include:
“Bowen: Tactical triumph for Israel, but Hezbollah won’t be deterred”, Jeremy Bowen, 18/9/24:
“The Israelis have used important, audacious weapons, which are clearly very effective in their terms.
But reports in Al Monitor, a respected Middle East newsletter, say that they were not able to use them in the way they hoped.
The original plan, it says, was for Israel to follow up with devastating attacks while Hezbollah was still reeling. The pager attack, the reports say, was to be the opening salvo in a big escalation – as part of an offensive or perhaps an invasion of southern Lebanon.
But these same reports say that Hezbollah was getting suspicious – forcing Israel to trigger these attacks early. So the Israelis have shown they can get into Hezbollah’s communications and shown they can humiliate them, but these attacks do not take the region one inch further back from all out war. Instead they push it closer.”
“What we know about the Hezbollah device explosions”, Matt Murphy & Joe Tidy, 17/9/24 – amended 18/9/24:
“What prompted the pager attack?
Unnamed US and Israeli officials told Axios that detonating the pagers all at once was initially planned as the opening move in an “all-out” offensive against Hezbollah. But in recent days Israel became concerned Hezbollah had become aware of the plan – so they were set off early.”
“Hezbollah pager explosions highlight shadow war”, Paul Adams, 18/9/24:
“But reports from Lebanon suggest that Israel may not have intended to use this doomsday weapon just now.
The “shock and awe” engendered by such an attack was probably being held in reserve for a moment of maximum need: either when Israel was about to launch a major assault on Lebanon or when it felt Hezbollah might be about to act first.
Neither of these appear to be the case, lending credence to reports that Israel triggered the explosive pagers because it believed its plot had been, or was in the process of being uncovered.”
“Death toll from Hezbollah pager explosions in Lebanon rises to 12”, David Gritten, 18/9/24:
“Axios meanwhile cited US officials as saying that Israel had decided to blow up the pagers “out of concern its secret operation might have been discovered”. “It was a use it or lose it moment,” one official was quoted as describing the timing.”
“Hezbollah device explosions: The unanswered questions”, Tom Bennett, 20/9/24:
“Why did the attack happen now?
There are several theories as to why the devices were triggered to explode this week.
One is that Israel chose this moment to send a devastating message to Hezbollah, following almost a year of escalating cross-border hostilities after Hezbollah fired rockets at or around northern Israel a day after the Hamas attack of 7 October.
The other is that Israel did not intend to put its plan in motion at this moment, but was forced to after fearing the plot was about to be exposed.
According to US outlet Axios, the original plan was for the pager attack to be the opening salvo of an all-out war as a way to try to cripple Hezbollah’s fighters.
But, it says, after Israel learned that Hezbollah had become suspicious, it chose to carry out the attack early.”
The Axios report quotes “three U.S. officials” and a “former Israeli official with knowledge of the operation”. It also refers to the Al Monitor report (produced by two journalists in the US) which is based entirely on claims supposedly made by “High-level regional intelligence sources”.
In other words, BBC editors considered it appropriate to recycle and uncritically amplify second hand claims made by anonymous sources in at least five BBC News website reports and two entries on a rolling live page.
The BBC has a guidance document relating to anonymity but that is based on the presumption that the BBC itself knows the identity of its source. BBC editorial guidelines on accuracy in relation to “unnamed sources” likewise apply to BBC produced content but the same guidelines do include a section relating to “material from third parties”. [emphasis added]
“3.3.13 Material supplied by third parties, including news providers, needs to be treated with appropriate caution, taking account of the reputation of the source.
We should normally only rely on an agency report if it can be substantiated by a BBC correspondent or if it is attributed to a reputable news agency.
We should only use other material supplied by third parties if it is credible and reliable.”
Clearly the none of the numerous BBC journalists who recycled and amplified the doubtful and unconfirmed second-hand claims from anonymous sources had bothered to first substantiate them.
Perhaps the operative word in this story is “credible”: far too many BBC journalists have demonstrated throughout the past year in particular that, regardless of the source, they consider any and every unsubstantiated claim concerning Israel’s actions to be credible and worthy of amplification, despite their supposed commitment to producing accurate and impartial “news you can trust”.
